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Search Results (10 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-124279 | 1 Elixir-grpc | 1 Grpc Server | 2026-11-13 | N/A |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc_server allows unauthenticated attackers to exhaust server memory via client-streaming or bidirectional-streaming requests. The streaming read clause of GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy.Handler.info/3 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy/handler.ex) asks Cowboy for up to 8,000,000 bytes per read and compares the running total with max_body_size only after the read returns. The gRPC length prefix of a message is not checked before the message is buffered. Each stream can therefore buffer up to one full read beyond the configured limit before it is refused, and many concurrent streams exhaust node memory. Releases before 1.0.6 apply no limit to streaming requests at all. This issue affects grpc_server: from 1.0.0 before 1.1.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-121809 | 1 Elixir-grpc | 2 Grpc, Grpc Server | 2026-11-13 | N/A |
| Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc_server and grpc allows unauthenticated attackers to occupy a BEAM scheduler indefinitely via a client-streaming or bidirectional-streaming request whose body ends inside a gRPC message. GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy.read_stream/1 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy.ex, and the Cowboy adapter in grpc before the package split) asks for more data whenever the buffer does not hold a complete message. Once the request body has ended, every further read returns an empty chunk, so the buffer never changes and the function retries without end. A single 5-byte length prefix sent with END_STREAM keeps one scheduler busy for as long as the connection stays open, and repeated requests exhaust all schedulers. This issue affects grpc_server: from 1.0.0 before 1.1.0; grpc: from 0.3.1 before 1.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-124278 | 1 Elixir-grpc | 2 Grpc, Grpc Server | 2026-11-13 | N/A |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc_server and grpc allows an attacker to make a handler act on a resource other than the one named in the URL of an HTTP-transcoded route, via a request with a gRPC Content-Type. Only the transcoding clause of GRPC.Server.do_handle_request/4 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server.ex, and lib/grpc/server.ex before the package split) applies the route's path bindings to the request message. The Cowboy handler picks that clause from the request Content-Type, not from the route. A request to a transcoded URL with application/grpc or application/grpc-web is decoded from the body alone, so every path-bound field takes its value from the body. A gateway, proxy rule or WAF that authorizes on the URL path sees one resource while the handler receives another. This issue affects grpc_server: from 1.0.0 before 1.1.0; grpc: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-121808 | 1 Elixir-grpc | 2 Grpc, Grpc Core | 2026-11-13 | N/A |
| Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc_core and grpc allows unauthenticated attackers to exhaust server memory via a compressed Erlang external term in a gRPC message body. GRPC.Codec.Erlpack.decode/2 (grpc_core/lib/grpc/codec/erlpack.ex, and lib/grpc/codec/erlpack.ex before the package split) passes the message body to :erlang.binary_to_term/2. That function inflates a compressed term in full before it returns. The codec sets no limit on the decoded size, and its type checks run only on the decoded term. The server's max_body_size limit counts the compressed bytes of the request. A request with Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack can therefore make the server allocate a term much larger than the request body. This issue affects grpc: from 0.4.0 before 1.0.0; grpc_core: from 1.0.0 before 1.1.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-123635 | 1 Elixir-grpc | 1 Grpc Server | 2026-11-13 | N/A |
| Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc_server allows a client to stall all later calls on a shared HTTP/2 connection via calls that the server refuses while their DATA frames are in flight. The stream handler grpc_stream_h (grpc_server/src/grpc_stream_h.erl) requests flow from Cowboy only for request data that has arrived. When the server refuses a call early, for example because the body exceeds max_body_size or the method is not implemented, Cowboy drops the DATA frames still in flight for that stream. Their bytes are not returned to the connection flow-control window. After enough refused calls the window is empty. No call on that connection can then send a request body, and each call waits until its deadline. Other connections are not affected. This issue affects grpc_server: from 1.0.0 before 1.1.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71397 | 1 Elixir-grpc | 1 Grpc Server | 2026-11-10 | N/A |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc_server allows unauthenticated attackers to exhaust memory and crash the node via an oversized client-streaming or bidirectional-streaming request body. The streaming read clause of 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy.Handler':info/3 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy/handler.ex) never checks the configured max_body_size. Only the unary read path enforces that cap. 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy':reading_stream/1 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy.ex) appends every received chunk to its buffer until a complete length-prefixed message arrives. A client can declare a very large message and send it across many small HTTP/2 DATA frames, and the server buffers all of it. This issue affects grpc_server: from 1.0.0 before 1.0.6. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48854 | 1 Elixir-grpc | 1 Grpc | 2026-09-24 | N/A |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows unauthenticated attackers to exhaust the BEAM's memory and crash the server by streaming a large or slow-trickle unary request body. 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy.Handler':read_full_body/3 (lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy/handler.ex) accumulates every received chunk into a single growing binary with no size cap. Additionally, when the client omits the grpc-timeout header, the per-chunk read timeout resolves to :infinity, allowing a slow-trickle client to keep the connection alive indefinitely while memory grows. A single connection is sufficient to exhaust server memory and crash the node. This issue affects grpc: from 0.3.0-alpha.2 before 1.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48853 | 1 Elixir-grpc | 1 Grpc | 2026-09-24 | 9.8 Critical |
| Deserialization of Untrusted Data and Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerabilities in elixir-grpc grpc allow unauthenticated attackers to crash the BEAM node via atom table exhaustion and, when a decoded term flows into a call site that invokes it, achieve remote code execution on the server. 'Elixir.GRPC.Codec.Erlpack':decode/2 (lib/grpc/codec/erlpack.ex) calls :erlang.binary_to_term/1 on the raw gRPC message body without the :safe option, no size bound, and no type guard. Any unauthenticated peer that sends a request with Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack can send a crafted payload that mints arbitrary new atoms (which are never garbage-collected, exhausting the bounded atom table and crashing the VM) or that encodes a fun term which, if applied anywhere downstream, executes attacker-controlled code inside the server process. This issue affects grpc: from 0.4.0 before 1.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48599 | 1 Elixir-grpc | 1 Grpc | 2026-09-24 | N/A |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows authenticated attackers to access or modify resources belonging to other users by smuggling a conflicting value for any path-bound field via the query string or request body. In 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Transcode':map_request/5 (lib/grpc/server/transcode.ex), all three clauses use Map.merge/2 with path bindings as the first argument, giving them the lowest merge precedence. A request such as GET /users/me/profile?user_id=victim (or a POST with {"user_id": "victim"} when body: "*") yields a decoded protobuf struct where the path-bound field carries the attacker-supplied value rather than the router-extracted value. Any handler that uses the path-bound field for authorization, multi-tenancy scoping, or ownership checks is silently bypassed. This issue affects grpc: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53430 | 1 Elixir-grpc | 1 Grpc | 2026-06-16 | N/A |
| Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc (GRPC.Compressor.Gzip, GRPC.Message modules) allows a denial of service via a gzip decompression bomb. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/grpc/compressor/gzip.ex, lib/grpc/message.ex and program routines 'Elixir.GRPC.Compressor.Gzip':decompress/1, 'Elixir.GRPC.Message':from_data/2. 'Elixir.GRPC.Compressor.Gzip':decompress/1 calls :zlib.gunzip/1 directly on attacker-controlled bytes with no decompressed-size limit, ratio check, or incremental decoding. Because this module is the registered gzip GRPC.Compressor implementation, it is invoked automatically whenever an incoming gRPC frame carries the grpc-encoding: gzip header. :zlib.gunzip/1 allocates the entire decompressed result as a single binary, so a small highly compressible payload (for example a few kilobytes of zeros, which gzip compresses at roughly 1000:1) expands to multiple gigabytes inside a single call. The max_receive_message_length limit is enforced only against the already-decompressed message, so it provides no protection. An unauthenticated remote peer can send a single crafted frame to exhaust the BEAM node's heap and trigger an out-of-memory kill. This issue affects grpc: from 0.4.0 before 1.0.0. | ||||
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